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Abstract: Bayesian model averaging attempts to combine parameter es-
timation and model uncertainty in one coherent framework. The choice of
prior is then critical. Within an explicit framework of ignorance we deﬁne
a ‘suitable’ prior as one which leads to a continuous and suitable analog to
the pretest estimator. The normal prior, used in standard Bayesian model
averaging, is shown to be unsuitable. The Laplace (or lasso) prior is almost
suitable. A suitable prior (the Subbotin prior) is proposed and its properties
are investigated.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C11, C51, C52.
Keywords: Model averaging, Bayesian analysis, Subbotin prior.
21 Introduction
Suppose a ruler seeks advice on a speciﬁc parameter, say next year’s inﬂation.
He has twelve advisors, and each advisor provides an estimate. When all
have left, the ruler has twelve estimates. In addition, he has an opinion
about each advisor based on past experience and current performance. How
does the ruler now obtain a single estimate? Let us consider two possibilities.
The ruler may think: Whom do I trust most? Whose advice do I think most
reliable? Then, he takes the advice of his most trusted advisor. This is the
ﬁrst method. Alternatively, he may consider all advisors useful, but not to
the same degree. Some are more experienced and more clever than others,
so they get a higher weight. Then, the ruler computes a weighted average of
the twelve estimates. This is the second method.
While the second method appeals to common sense, econometric practice
favors the ﬁrst method. In econometric practice one typically ﬁrst selects a
model and then computes estimates within this selected model. There are
many alternative models, each of which provides some insight into the value
of the required parameter, and these other models play a role in the model
selection procedure, but not in the estimation procedure. Model selection
and estimation are completely separated, just like the ruler only listening to
his most trusted advisor. In econometrics, the ﬁrst method is called ‘pretest-
ing’. The second method, called ‘model averaging’, not only appeals to com-
mon sense, but also has two major advantages. First, it avoids arbitrary
thresholds (like 1.96), thus forcing continuity on a previously discontinuous
estimator; second, it allows us to combine model selection and estimation
into one procedure, thus moving from conditional to unconditional estima-
tor characteristics.
Standard Bayesian model averaging (BMA), though appealing in princi-
ple, has however three drawbacks. First, the prior is almost always assumed
to be normal, and this is not good, because it leads to unbounded risk and
other undesirable properties caused by the fact that the tails of the nor-
mal distribution are too thin. (In this paper, risk is always deﬁned under
squared-error loss; hence it is synonymous to mean squared error.) Second,
the variance in the prior distribution (such as Zellner’s g-prior) is chosen
ad hoc for computational ease without theoretical justiﬁcation. Third, the
computational eﬀort required in applying BMA is very large, so that approx-
imating methods like Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) are needed.
In a recent paper, Magnus et al. (2010) resolved all three problems by in-
3troducing the weighted-average least squares (WALS) procedure and propos-
ing the Laplace prior. One of the features of this approach is an explicit
treatment of ignorance. Bayesian methods are designed for situations where
prior information is available, in which case they guide us as to how this
information should be combined with information from the data. But when
no prior information is available and nevertheless informative priors need to
be speciﬁed (as is the case with BMA), then an explicit treatment of igno-
rance is required. We shall not deﬁne the vague concept of ignorance, but
we shall make ignorance explicit, at least in part, by introducing the concept
of ‘neutrality’ in Section 4.
The econometric framework is the regression model
y = X1β1 + X2β2 + ε = Xβ + ε, ε ∼ N(0,σ
2In), (1)
where y (n × 1) is the vector of observations, X1 (n × k1) and X2 (n × k2)
are matrices of deterministic regressors, ε is a random vector of unobservable
disturbances, and β1 and β2 are unknown parameter vectors. We assume
that k1 ≥ 1, k2 ≥ 0, k := k1 + k2 ≤ n − 1, and that X := (X1 : X2) has full
column-rank. The reason for distinguishing between X1 and X2 is that X1
contains explanatory variables which we want in the model on theoretical or
other grounds, while X2 contains additional explanatory variables of which
we are less certain. The columns of X1 are called ‘focus’ regressors, and the
columns of X2 ‘auxiliary’ regressors.
In the simplest case k2 = 1 we have only one auxiliary regressor, which
we write as x2 rather than as X2, and only two models to consider: restricted
(where β2 = 0) and unrestricted. The least-squares estimator of β1 in the
restricted model is ˆ β1r = (X′
1X1)−1X′
1y. In the unrestricted model we have





































Now consider the weighted-average least-squares (WALS) estimator of β1,
b1 := λˆ β1u + (1 − λ)ˆ β1r = ˆ β1r − σ(λˆ θ)q,
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Figure 1: Estimators t(x) of θ when x ∼ N(θ,1).
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 may depend on y, but only through the residuals M1y. The











where λˆ θ is a (shrinkage) estimator of θ. The equivalence theorem (Magnus
and Durbin, 1999, Theorem 2; Danilov and Magnus, 2004, Theorem 1) is in
fact much more general, but its essence is well reﬂected in (3). The theorem
implies that if we can ﬁnd a λ-function such that λˆ θ is an optimal estimator
of θ (in the mean squared error sense), then the same λ-function will pro-
vide an optimal WALS estimator of β1. The problem of estimating β1 in a
regression context is thus reduced to estimating θ from a single observation
ˆ θ ∼ N(θ,1). The idea of not analyzing the general regression problem, but
only the estimation of the mean θ from a single observation x with known
variance, goes back to Bickel (1983, 1984).
5We study this seemingly trivial problem in isolation, writing x instead
of ˆ θ. Thus, we have one observation x|θ ∼ N(θ,1), and the question is how
to estimate θ. In Figure 1 we consider seven estimators t(x) of θ. First,
the ‘usual’ estimator t(x) = x and the ‘silly’ estimator t(x) = 0. Then the
pretest estimator, a combination of the ‘usual’ and ’silly’ estimators:
t(x) =
(
x if |x| > c,
0 if |x| ≤ c,
for some c > 0. Next four Bayesian estimators, based on a prior π on θ.
These can be viewed as continuous versions of the pretest estimator: the
‘normal’ estimator based on a normal prior, the Laplace estimator based
on a Laplace prior, and two Subbotin estimators based on a Subbotin prior
(introduced in Section 4).
The ‘usual’ estimator is good when x is large but not when x is small,
while the ‘silly’ estimator is good when x is small, but not when x is large.
The pretest estimator is a compromise, but not a very good compromise,
since it is discontinuous and hence inadmissable. The ‘normal’ estimator
has unbounded risk and x − t(x) diverges to ∞ as x → ∞. The Laplace
estimator has bounded risk and x − t(x) converges to a positive constant,
but not to zero. This is undesirable, because we would wish that, for large x,
the estimator ‘is close to x’ in the sense that x−t(x) converges to zero. The
Subbotin estimator, which is the one advocated in this paper, possesses this
property. This estimator depends on a parameter 0 < q < 1 and Figure 1
shows (for q = 0.5 and q = 0.1) that the Subbotin estimator curves back to
the 45 ◦ line, in contrast to the Laplace estimator.
Bayesian averaging of Bayesian estimators was ﬁrst proposed by Leamer
(1978), and Bayesian averaging of classical estimators by Raftery (1995). A
large literature on Bayesian model averaging now exists. An alternative ap-
proach, ﬁrst proposed by Frank and Friedman (1993), is to consider penalized
regression by computing










for some λ > 0 and q > 0. The case q = 2 is the familiar ridge regression.
Tibshirani (1996) studied the case q = 1, which he called the lasso (least
absolute shrinkage and selection operator). Park and Casella (2008) and
Hans (2009) exploited the fact that the lasso has a Bayesian counterpart,
which they called the lasso prior. The lasso prior is in fact the Laplace
density. The Subbotin estimator proposed in the current paper is related
6to the penalized regression problem when 0 < q < 1. A diﬀerent penalty
function called SCAD (smoothly clipped absolute deviation) was introduced
by Fan and Li (2001). Our proposed (Bayesian) estimator is inspired by
the SCAD (non-Bayesian) estimator in that it ‘curves back’ to the 45 ◦ line
when x is large, as is well illustrated in Figure 2 of Fan and Li (2001). What
they call the ‘hard’ thresholding function is in fact the pretest estimator,
and their lasso and SCAD thresholding functions in a non-Bayesian context
are discontinuous counterparts of the Laplace and Subbotin estimators in a
Bayesian context.
The purpose of this paper is thus to ﬁnd a suitable prior π, which appro-
priately reﬂects our notion of ignorance and, when combined with a single
observation x|θ ∼ N(θ,1), leads to an estimator t(x) satisfying all proper-
ties which we consider to be desirable. In Section 2 we impose some general
restrictions on the prior π (Assumption A) and obtain some important prop-
erties of the posterior mean t(x) and of the posterior variance σ2(x), while
assuming only that the prior π satisﬁes Assumption A. In Section 3 we note
that Assumption A does not imply that ‘t(x) is close to x’ when x is large.
Our main result is Theorem 1, where we provide necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions on the prior such that x − t(x) → 0 as x → ∞. In search of a prior
which satisﬁes Assumption A and the condition of Theorem 1, we arrive in






(c > 0, q > 0),
and we prove in Theorem 2 that this prior is ‘suitable’ if and only if 0 < q < 1.
We obtain properties of the implied estimator t(x), the posterior variance
σ2(x), the deviation x−t(x), and the shrinkage factor t(x)/x. To gain further
insight into the properties of the estimator t(x) based on the Subbotin prior,
we take a frequentist view in Section 5, where we consider the bias, standard
deviation, and root mean squared error of t(x) as an estimator of θ, when x is
an observation from the N(θ,1) distribution. Then, in Section 6, we move to
the regression context and to WALS estimation, and reconsider two growth
models typically estimated in the growth empirics literature. Our main aim
in this section is to analyze the sensitivity of our results to the choice of
prior. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A gives some background mathematical
results, and Appendix B provides the proofs of the two theorems.
72 Properties of the posterior mean
Throughout we shall impose the following restrictions on the prior density.
Assumption A: The prior π is
(A.1) symmetric around zero: π(−θ) = π(θ) for all θ > 0;
(A.2) positive and non-increasing on (0,∞);
(A.3) diﬀerentiable, except possibly at 0;
and
(A.4) ω(θ) := −π′(θ)/π(θ) has a limit (possibly ∞) as θ → ∞.
Letting φ denote the standard-normal density, we can write the posterior
density as
p(θ|x) =
φ(x − θ)π(θ) R ∞
−∞ φ(x − θ)π(θ)dθ
.






Then, µj(x) := E((x − θ)j|x) = Aj(x)/A0(x), and hence the mean and vari-
ance of θ in the posterior distribution are:
t(x) = −µ1(x) + x, σ
2(x) = µ2(x) − µ
2
1(x). (4)
In this section we study some features of the posterior density p(θ|x),
while assuming only that the prior π satisﬁes Assumption A. This allows us
to obtain some important properties of the posterior mean t(x), the Bayes
estimator under squared-error loss, and of the posterior variance σ2(x).
























0(x) = −A1(x) and
A
′













The posterior density is non-degenerate for any x. Hence, t′(x) = σ2(x) > 0
for any x, and t is increasing on (−∞,∞). The function t is odd: t(−x) =
−t(x), so that t(0) = 0. Also,
0 < t(x) < x (x > 0). (6)
To prove (6) we need two results from Appendix A. It is clear that A0(x) > 0
for all x. It follows from (14) that A1(0) = 0 and that A1(x) > 0 for all x > 0.
Hence, µ1(x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ 0 with equality if and only if x = 0. It follows
from (15) that µ1(x) ≤ x with equality if and only if x = 0. Hence, µ1(0) = 0
and 0 < µ1(x) < x for all x > 0. Equation (6) then follows from (4).
The derivatives in (5) show in particular that, at x = 0,
t(0) = 0, t
′(0) = µ2(0) > 0, t




In fact, all even-ordered derivatives (t, t′′, and so on) vanish at x = 0.
We already know that µ2(0) > 0. To prove that µ2(0) < 1 we note that









The inequality is strict, because (1 − θ2)(π(θ) − π(1)) = 0 holds only for all
θ if π is constant and hence improper. Thus we have proved
0 < µ2(0) < 1.
We know that t is increasing. We now show that, if Assumption A holds,
then
t(x) → ∞ as x → ∞.
Let M > 1. Then, using (4), and (9), (12), and (15) from Appendix A, we


























for x suﬃciently large. The two inequalities together show that t(x) ≥ M/8,
and since M can be arbitrarily large, t is unbounded.
The variance function σ2 is even: σ2(−x) = σ2(x), and satisﬁes σ2(x) > 0
for all x, and σ2(0) = µ2(0). For small x we have
σ








so that σ2 is increasing on a small interval (0,δ) if the kurtosis γ2(0) > 0.
Finally, we consider the ‘shrinkage’ function λ(x) := t(x)/x. This func-
tion is also even: λ(−x) = λ(x), and it satisﬁes, because of (6),
0 < λ(x) < 1 (x > 0).
From the expansion of t(x) we have, for small x,








so that λ (like σ2) is increasing on a small interval (0,δ) if γ2(0) > 0.
3 Asymptotic behavior of x − t(x)
The above analysis shows that a number of desirable properties of t(x) follow
from Assumption A. The assumption does not, however, imply that ‘t(x) is
close to x’ when x is large. This is important because, if we have one ob-
servation x from the N(θ,1) distribution, then the ‘usual’ estimator may be
criticized for not performing well near zero, but for large x it is the obvious
candidate. To make the statement ‘t(x) is close to x’ precise, we need the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 (suitability): Consider a univariate random variable x with
x|θ ∼ N(θ,1) together with a prior π on θ. Let t(x) and σ2(x) denote the
mean and variance of θ in the posterior distribution. If π satisﬁes Assump-
tion A, and x−t(x) → 0 and σ2(x) → 1 as x → ∞, then π is called suitable.
We note that if π is suitable, then a third requirement, namely that the
10shrinkage factor λ(x) → 1 as x → ∞, is trivially fulﬁlled. In fact, we have
λ(x) = 1 + o(1/x).
To see why Assumption A is not suﬃcient for any of these three require-
ments to hold, consider the prior π(θ) ∝ exp(−c|θ|q), where c > 0 and q > 0.
(The symbol ∝ means: is proportional to.) For q > 2 (thin tails), none of
the three properties holds: λ(x) and σ2(x) converge to zero, and x − t(x)
converges to inﬁnity. For q = 2 (normal prior), λ(x) < 1 and σ2(x) < 1 are
constant, and x − t(x) goes to inﬁnity. For q = 1 (Laplace prior), two of
the three properties hold. Only x − t(x) goes to a constant, not zero. This
suggests that suitability occurs when 0 < q < 1. We shall see in Section 4
that this is indeed the case.
But ﬁrst we consider the limiting behavior of g(x) := x−t(x) for a general





The hazard rate is a well-established characteristic of a distribution. Hazard
rates can be increasing or decreasing (or both). If somebody has lived a long
time, he or she will probably die soon (positive duration dependence, increas-
ing hazard rate). But someone without employment has a higher chance of
ﬁnding a job the shorter is the unemployment spell (negative duration de-
pendence, decreasing hazard rate).
Our main result gives a complete characterization, in terms of the hazard
rate, of the class of priors π with the property that g(x) → 0 as x → ∞, and
can be stated as follows.
Theorem 1: Under Assumption A,
lim
θ→∞
h(θ) = 0 ⇐⇒ lim
x→∞g(x) = 0.
The tail of π can be classiﬁed according to the limiting behavior of h. The
condition limθ→∞ h(θ) = 0 means that the tail of π is ‘medium-long’ or ‘long’;
see Schuster (1984).
4 The Subbotin prior
In search of a suitable prior, let us consider a general class of densities, the




(c > 0, q > 0, α < 1).
11For q = 1 this becomes the reﬂected gamma density, and other special cases
are the reﬂected Weibull (α + q = 1), Laplace (α = 0, q = 1), and normal
(α = 0, q = 2) densities.
To satisfy Assumption A we must have 0 ≤ α < 1. If α > 0 then
π(0) = ∞. Since we wish to stay close to the Laplace prior (where π(0) is






(c > 0, q > 0). (7)
This density was ﬁrst proposed by Subbotin (1923), and we shall call it the
‘Subbotin’ density. Special cases are the normal density (q = 2) and the
Laplace density (q = 1). To satisfy the condition of Theorem 1 we must have
0 < q < 1, and in fact this is precisely what is required for suitability.
Theorem 2: The Subbotin prior is suitable if and only if 0 < q < 1.
All moments of the Subbotin density exist. Since the density is symmet-





In particular, the variance and kurtosis of θ are
var(θ) =
Γ(3/q)/Γ(1/q)




The Subbotin prior involves two parameters: c and q. How should these
parameters be chosen? As discussed in the Introduction, we wish to make
ignorance explicit, at least in part. The quantiﬁcation of ignorance in a
Bayesian setting is an old problem and was already discussed in the clas-
sical essays of Bayes (1763) and Laplace (1814); see Bauwens et al. (1999,
Section 4.3), who also discuss, among others, Jeﬀreys’ (1961) invariance prin-
ciple and Bernardo’s (1979) reference prior. Our approach to this problem
is a little diﬀerent. Suppose that our interest is in estimating β1 in the
model (1),
y = X1β1 + β2x2 + ε,
where we have again taken k2 = 1 for simplicity. We are not sure whether
the auxiliary parameter β2 is zero or not, so that we consider two models:
the restricted (with β2 = 0) and the unrestricted. If we include the auxiliary
variable x2 in our regression equation, then ¯ R2 (the adjusted R2) will increase
12if, and only if, the t-ratio of the auxiliary parameter is larger than one in








as in (2), then MSE(ˆ β1r) ≤ MSE(ˆ β1u) if, and only if, |θ| ≤ 1, where ˆ β1r and
ˆ β1u denote the restricted and unrestricted estimator of β1 respectively; see
Magnus and Durbin (1999, Theorem 1). Based on these facts we shall say
that we are ‘neutral’ about the auxiliary parameter β2 when (a) we don’t
know whether β2 is positive or negative, and (b) we don’t know whether
including the corresponding auxiliary regressor x2 will increase or decrease
the mean squared error of the estimated focus parameter β1. More formally,
we choose the prior distribution such that the prior median of θ is zero and
the prior median of |θ| is one.
















then π is called neutral.
The concept of neutrality, introduced by Magnus (2000), thus attempts to
capture the vague concept of ignorance in an explicit, transparent, and ap-
plicable deﬁnition.
For a neutral Subbotin prior c is determined by q as given in Table 1
for selected values of q. Under neutrality, both the standard deviation (sd)
and kurtosis (kur) of the prior increase when q decreases, because the tail
becomes thicker. We also present two quantiles. Neutrality implies that
Q(4/8) = 0 and Q(6/8) = 1. The table gives Q(5/8) and Q(7/8). If the
prior is relatively ﬂat between 0 and 1, then Q(5/8) should be close to 0.5.
We see that the smaller is q, the less ﬂat is the prior between 0 and 1. Small
values of q (like q = 0.1) are therefore unappealing from the point of view of
ignorance. We could partially repair this by modifying the Subbotin prior,




which we call the ‘modiﬁed’ Subbotin prior (Subbotin-mod). For q = 1 we
get the Laplace prior back, but for 0 < q < 1 we obtain a ﬂatter distribution
between 0 and 1. In Table 1 we present the corresponding moments and
13Table 1: Moments and quantiles of some neutral priors.
q c sd kur Q(5/8) Q(7/8)
Normal 2.0 0.2275 1.48 0.00 0.47 1.71
Laplace 1.0 0.6931 2.04 3.00 0.42 2.00
Subbotin 0.9 0.8011 2.19 4.03 0.40 2.06
Subbotin 0.8 0.9369 2.40 5.57 0.39 2.14
Subbotin 0.7 1.1125 2.69 8.06 0.37 2.25
Subbotin 0.6 1.3478 3.14 12.6 0.35 2.38
Subbotin 0.5 1.6783 3.89 22.2 0.33 2.57
Subbotin 0.4 2.1757 5.37 49.0 0.30 2.86
Subbotin 0.3 3.0066 9.21 171 0.25 3.35
Subbotin 0.2 4.6709 27.1 1956 0.20 4.37
Subbotin 0.1 9.6687 691 2,823,513 0.11 8.07
Subbotin-mod 0.5 2.0323 3.16 16.3 0.37 2.33
Subbotin-mod 0.1 17.0367 14.0 85,488 0.34 2.78
quantiles for q = 0.5 and q = 0.1. For q = 0.1 the diﬀerence between
Subbotin and modiﬁed Subbotin is large, but for q = 0.5 it is small.
In practical applications we recommend the Subbotin prior with q = 0.5.




















Hence, for neutrality we ﬁnd c from the equation ec = 2(c + 1).
Combining the prior with the observation x|θ ∼ N(θ,1), we obtain charac-
teristics of the posterior distribution. In Figure 1 we presented the function t.
In Figures 2–4 we present the functions σ2, g, and λ for four priors: normal
(q = 2), Laplace (q = 1), and Subbotin (q = 0.5 and q = 0.1). For the nor-
mal prior, the posterior variance is constant at σ2 = 1/(2c+1) ≈ 0.6873. For
the Laplace prior the variance increases to one, and for the Subbotin prior
with q < 1, the variance also tends to one, but σ2(x) is not an increasing
function. Regarding the deviations g(x), we have t(x) = λx with constant
λ < 1 for the normal prior, and hence g(x) = (1 − λ)x, which diverges to
inﬁnity. For the Laplace prior we have g(x) → log2 ≈ 0.6931, and for the
Subbotin prior with q < 1 we have g(x) → 0. Finally, the shrinkage factor




















Figure 2: Posterior variances σ2(x).






















Subbotin   (0.5)
Figure 3: Deviations g(x) = x − t(x).
λ(x) = 1/(2c + 1) ≈ 0.6873 is constant for the normal prior, and therefore
does not converge to one. For q ≤ 1, λ(x) < 1 converges to one, and the
graphs in Figure 4 suggest that λ increases.




















Subbotin   (0.5)
Figure 4: Shrinkage factors λ(x) = t(x)/x.
5 Root mean squared error comparisons
So far we have considered a Bayesian framework where we have one obser-
vation x|θ ∼ N(θ,1) and a prior π(θ). This leads to a posterior distribution
and a posterior mean t(x), the Bayes estimator. In this section we take a
frequentist point of view and consider the properties of t(x) as an estimator
of θ when x ∼ N(θ,1). In this framework θ is an unknown deterministic
parameter. Thus we are interested in the bias E(t(x) −θ), and the standard
deviation (SD) and the root mean squared error (RMSE),
SD =
p
E(t(x) − E(t(x)))2, RMSE =
p
E(t(x) − θ)2,
as a function of θ. We consider six estimators: the ‘usual’ estimator t(x) =
x, the ‘silly’ estimator t(x) = 0, and four Bayesian estimators based on a
Subbotin prior, namely normal (q = 2), Laplace (q = 1), and Subbotin
(q = 0.5 and q = 0.1).
The bias of the six estimators is graphed in Figure 5. The bias is non-
positive when θ > 0 and non-negative when θ < 0. The ‘usual’ estimator is
of course the best; its bias is zero. The ‘silly’ estimator is the worst. The
estimator based on a normal prior is also bad: its bias diverges as θ → ∞.
The bias of the Laplace estimator converges to a constant, while the bias
of the Subbotin estimators for 0 < q < 1 converges to zero. Of these two
estimators, the Subbotin (0.5) estimator has a smaller bias when θ is small,
while the Subbotin (0.1) estimator has a smaller bias when θ is large.






















Figure 5: Bias comparisons as a function of θ.





































Figure 6: Standard deviation comparisons as a function of θ.
The standard deviation of the six estimators is given in Figure 6. The
‘silly’ estimator is of course the best; its standard deviation is zero. The stan-
dard deviation of the ‘usual’ estimator is one (constant). The Laplace and
‘normal’ estimators have standard deviation below one, while the standard
deviation of the Subbotin estimators for 0 < q < 1 is below one for small
values of θ and above one for large values of θ. The standard deviation of
17the ‘silly’ and ‘normal’ estimators does not converge to one.























Figure 7: RMSE comparisons as a function of θ.
Most important is the combination of bias and standard deviation: the
root mean squared error. This function is graphed in Figure 7 for the six
estimators and for the ‘theoretical minimum’. If we deﬁne T as the class
of all real-valued functions t deﬁned on R and satisfying: (a) 0 ≤ t(x) ≤ x
for x ≥ 0, (b) t(−x) = −t(x) for all x, and (c) t(x)/x is non-decreasing on







The square root of this is the ‘theoretical minimum’ graphed in Figure 7.
Comparing the MSE with the theoretical minimum in T gives us the
regret,
regret(θ) = MSE(θ) −
θ2
1 + θ2,
arguably a more relevant concept than risk. The regret of the ‘silly’ and
‘normal’ estimators is unbounded. The regret of the ‘usual’ estimator in
bounded, but large for small values of θ. The Laplace estimator is ‘near-
optimal’ in terms of regret (Magnus, 2002), but its regret does not vanish
for θ → ∞. This leaves the Subbotin estimators for 0 < q < 1. The closer
we stay to the Laplace estimator (where q = 1) the better will be the regret
performance. Hence, q = 0.5 is preferred over q = 0.1.
18We conclude from the pictures that the Subbotin (0.5) estimator remains
close to the Laplace estimator, but that it has the pleasant property that its
bias goes to zero and its RMSE goes to one as θ → ∞, in contrast to the
Laplace estimator.
6 Application to growth empirics
In order to assess the practical application of WALS estimation with the
Subbotin prior, we re-estimate the models considered in Magnus et al. (2010),
where WALS estimation with a Laplace prior was applied to growth empirics.
We analyze two models. Model 1 can be interpreted as a direct test of the
proximate neoclassical growth theory against the fundamental new growth
theories of institutions, geography, fractionalization, and religion. Model 2
deviates from the proximate versus fundamental classiﬁcation, and tests the
robustness of the endogenous growth model using the distinction between
focus and auxiliary regressors.
Table 2: Model speciﬁcations, focus and auxiliary regressors.
Model 1 Model 2 Mean SE
CONSTANT Focus Focus 1.0000 0.0000
GDP60 Focus Focus 7.5253 0.8612
EQUIPINV Focus Focus 0.0432 0.0344
SCHOOL60 Focus Focus 0.7807 0.2556
LIFE60 Focus Focus 56.0676 1.1566
DPOP Focus Auxiliary 0.0206 0.0100
LAW Auxiliary Focus 0.5518 0.3332
TROPICS Auxiliary Focus 0.5481 0.4709
AVELF Auxiliary Focus 0.2984 0.2797
CONFUC Auxiliary Focus 0.0185 0.0862
MINING — Auxiliary 0.0482 0.0792
PRIGHTS — Auxiliary 3.4551 1.9073
MALARIA — Auxiliary 0.2866 0.4036
In both models the dependent variable is GROWTH. The regressors and
their role as either focus or auxiliary are given in Table 2. Model 1 contains six
focus regressors (including the constant term) and four auxiliary regressors.
It is motivated by the neoclassical growth model and thus contains all Solow
determinants as focus regressors, namely the constant term; the initial capital
stock of an economy (GDP60), measured as the log of GDP per capita in
1960; the 1960–1985 equipment investment share of GDP (EQUIPINV); the
19total gross enrollment rate in primary schooling in 1960 (SCHOOL60); life
expectancy at age zero, measured in 1960 (LIFE60); and population growth
rate between 1960 and 1990 (DPOP).
To test this neoclassical model and its proximate growth determinants
we include four auxiliary regressors in Model 1: a rule of law index (LAW)
as a measure of the importance of institutions; the country’s fraction of
tropical area (TROPICS); an average index of ethnolinguistic fragmentation
(AVELF); and the fraction of Confucian population in the country (CON-
FUC).
Model 2 contains nine focus regressors and four auxiliary regressors, and
it attempts more speciﬁcally to identify the factors driving growth and tech-
nological progress. All regressors of our ﬁrst model are included in Model 2
as focus regressors, except DPOP which is now an auxiliary regressor. The
three new auxiliary regressors are: the fraction of GDP produced in mining
(MINING); an index for political rights (PRIGHTS), serving as a second
institutional variable (the other is LAW); and malaria prevalence in 1966
(MALARIA), another geographical variable (next to TROPICS). A detailed
explanation of all variables is given in the Appendix of Magnus et al. (2010).
For each of the two models we consider three Bayesian model averag-
ing methods: Bayesian model averaging based on a normal prior (BMA);
Weighted-average least squares (WALS) estimation based on a Laplace prior
(q = 1); and WALS estimation based on a Subbotin prior (q = 0.5). The es-
timation results are given in Tables 3 and 4. Note that the ﬁrst two columns
in Tables 3 and 4 are the same as the last two columns in Tables 2 and 4
of Magnus et al. (2010). The Matlab codes used in the estimation can be
downloaded from http://center.uvt.nl/staﬀ/magnus/wals.
All regressors have the same signs across estimation methods and model
speciﬁcations. The regressors GDP60, TROPICS, and AVELF in Models 1
and 2, and the regressors MINING and MALARIA in Model 2 are negatively
correlated with growth, as expected. However, contrary to expectation, the
coeﬃcient of PRIGHTS is negative in Model 2. All other coeﬃcients are pos-
itive, indicating that higher shares of physical and human capital, stability
in terms of a suﬃcient rule of law, and a larger fraction of Confucian popu-
lation have a positive inﬂuence on economic growth. Not only the signs are
the same, but also the sizes of the estimates are close over the two models.
Our main interest is in the comparison of the WALS results based on
the new Subbotin prior to those based on the Laplace prior. The economic
impact of all robust and important regressors does not vary much between
the three estimators. Comparing the estimates and standard errors of BMA
with those based on the Laplace and Subbotin (0.5) priors, two conclusions
emerge. First, the WALS estimates and standard errors based on Subbotin
20Table 3: Estimates (and standard errors), Model 1.
BMA WALS with Subbotin prior
q = 1.0 q = 0.5
Focus regressors
CONSTANT 0.0492 (0.0229) 0.0594 (0.0221) 0.0585 (0.0222)
GDP60 −0.0139 (0.0035) −0.0156 (0.0033) −0.0156 (0.0033)
EQUIPINV 0.1644 (0.0615) 0.1555 (0.0551) 0.1498 (0.0557)
SCHOOL60 0.0160 (0.0102) 0.0175 (0.0097) 0.0176 (0.0097)
LIFE60 0.0008 (0.0004) 0.0009 (0.0004) 0.0008 (0.0004)
DPOP 0.1654 (0.2770) 0.2651 (0.2487) 0.2777 (0.2523)
Auxiliary regressors
LAW 0.0109 (0.0093) 0.0147 (0.0065) 0.0159 (0.0068)
TROPICS −0.0035 (0.0047) −0.0055 (0.0037) −0.0056 (0.0040)
AVELF −0.0021 (0.0047) −0.0053 (0.0048) −0.0050 (0.0046)
CONFUC 0.0612 (0.0185) 0.0443 (0.0163) 0.0468 (0.0175)
Table 4: Estimates (and standard errors), Model 2.
BMA WALS with Subbotin prior
q = 1.0 q = 0.5
Focus regressors
CONSTANT 0.0862 (0.0239) 0.0879 (0.0246) 0.0871 (0.0246)
GDP60 −0.0164 (0.0033) −0.0167 (0.0033) −0.0166 (0.0033)
EQUIPINV 0.1423 (0.0553) 0.1379 (0.0562) 0.1391 (0.0558)
CONFUC 0.0550 (0.0169) 0.0550 (0.0167) 0.0549 (0.0167)
SCHOOL60 0.0162 (0.0099) 0.0156 (0.0096) 0.0157 (0.0096)
LIFE60 0.0006 (0.0003) 0.0006 (0.0003) 0.0006 (0.0003)
LAW 0.0171 (0.0067) 0.0183 (0.0066) 0.0181 (0.0067)
TROPICS −0.0044 (0.0041) −0.0053 (0.0040) −0.0051 (0.0040)
AVELF −0.0050 (0.0062) −0.0049 (0.0059) −0.0049 (0.0060)
Auxiliary regressors
MINING −0.0003 (0.0063) −0.0056 (0.0149) −0.0048 (0.0134)
DPOP 0.0650 (0.1705) 0.2147 (0.2178) 0.1882 (0.2177)
PRIGHTS −0.0002 (0.0007) −0.0008 (0.0010) −0.0006 (0.0010)
MALARIA −0.0072 (0.0070) −0.0075 (0.0050) −0.0074 (0.0053)
(0.5) are close to those based on Laplace, while BMA is not so close. Second,
the estimates and standard errors of the focus variables are much closer to the
Laplace results than those of the auxiliary variables. Hence, if our primary
interest is on estimating the focus variables, then the practical diﬀerence
21between Laplace and Subbotin (0.5) is negligible. This is partly because
in our two models the t-ratios are all of moderate size, while the diﬀerence
between Laplace and Subbotin would especially show for small and large
t-values.
7 Concluding remarks
The strength and beauty of Bayesian model averaging lies in the fact that
it combines parameter estimation and model uncertainty in one coherent
framework. It provides a natural extension of pretest estimation, but while
pretest estimation is discontinuous, BMA in continuous. The tradition in
BMA is to make minimal assumptions on the prior. In this paper we deﬁne a
class of suitable priors, which do justice to our ideas of ignorance and lead to
well-behaved estimators. The normal prior, used in standard Bayesian model
averaging, is not suitable. The Laplace (or lasso) prior is almost suitable.
We obtain a necessary and suﬃcient (and easily interpreted) condition on
the prior so that the estimator t(x) ‘is close to x’ asymptotically, in the
sense that x − t(x) → 0 as x → ∞. This is our main theoretical result
(Theorem 1). Imposing this condition to the Subbotin prior, we show that
it is suitable for 0 < q < 1. We provide both Bayesian and frequentist
properties of the estimator, and an empirical application to growth empirics.
The Subbotin estimator when applied in the context of weighted-average least
squares (WALS) combines transparency in the treatment of ignorance with
a trivial computational burden (and hence shares the attractive properties
of the Laplace estimator), but it has better properties than the Laplace
estimator when the t-ratios of some of the auxiliary parameters are large.
Appendix A: Some properties of Aj (j = 0,1,2)










We have, for j = 0,1,...,
A2j(x) = A2j(−x), A2j+1(x) = −A2j+1(−x).
In this appendix we obtain alternative expressions for A0 and A1, and one











To obtain an alternative expression for A1 we note ﬁrst that, since π is non-
increasing on (0,∞),
0 < θπ(θ) ≤
Z θ
0
π(ξ)dξ (θ > 0).
The right-hand side converges to 0 for θ ↓ 0, because π is integrable. Hence,
lim
θ↓0
θπ(θ) = 0. (10)
Deﬁne the function







= −(x + θ)φ(x + θ) − (x − θ)φ(x − θ).


































(x > 0) (12)
and recalling that ω(θ) = −π′(θ)/π(θ), we obtain the required alternative






23We see that, for x ≥ 0,
A0(x) > 0, A1(x) ≥ 0, A2(x) > 0, (14)
where the ﬁrst and third inequalities are trivial, and the second inequality
follows from (13). In fact, A1(0) = 0 and A1(x) > 0 for x > 0. This fact
together with A′
0(x) = −A1(x) implies that A0 is decreasing on [0,∞) and
that A0(x) ≤ A0(0) ≤ φ(0).
Finally we show that A1(x) < xA0(x) for all x > 0. This follows because
xA0(x) − A1(x) = x
Z ∞
0














2η(θx)φ(θ)π(θ)dθ ≥ 0. (15)
The inequality is strict for x > 0.
Appendix B: Proofs of the theorems
Proof of Theorem 1: To prove suﬃciency, assume that h(θ) → 0 as θ → ∞.
Then, by l’Hˆ opital’s rule and Assumption (A.4), we have ω(θ) → 0 as θ → ∞.





















































24using (16), where we have chosen M = M(ε) > 0 such that supθ≥M ω(θ) <












This shows that g(x) → 0 as x → ∞.
To prove necessity, assume that it is not true that h(θ) → 0 as θ → ∞.
Then, limθ→∞ ω(θ) > 0. (If limθ→∞ ω(θ) = 0, then it follows, again by
l’Hˆ opital’s rule, that limθ→∞ h(θ) = 0, a contradiction.) Hence we have, for








0 (eθx − e−θx)ω(θ)φ(θ)π(θ)dθ
R ∞




M (eθx − e−θx)φ(θ)π(θ)dθ
R ∞




































→ 0 as x → ∞. (18)
This shows that the ratio of integrals on the right-hand side of (17) converges
to one, and hence that the right-hand side of (17) converges to ω∗/2. Hence,
g(x) does not converge to zero. This shows that the condition h(θ) → 0 is
necessary and concludes the proof.
25Proof of Theorem 2: If q ≥ 1, then the condition of Theorem 1 is not
satisﬁed, and hence the Subbotin prior is not suitable. Let us assume that
0 < q < 1. Then, Assumption A holds and, in addition, π is twice diﬀeren-







as θ → ∞. Also, π(0) is ﬁnite. For such a prior, x − t(x) → 0 as x → ∞ by
(the proof of) Theorem 1. Hence, if we can show that σ2(x) → 1 as x → ∞,
then the prior is suitable. To show this we consider the function













∂θ2 = (x + θ)
2φ(x + θ) + (x − θ)
2φ(x − θ) − S(θ,x).
Integrating by parts gives












We obtain, for any M > 0,






































and A1(x)/A0(x) → 0 by Theorem 1, it suﬃces to show that B(x)/A0(x) → 0.


























′(M − x)π(0) = (x − M)e
−x2/2e
Mxπ(0)φ(M),



















e−Mxφ(M)((x − M)π(0) + 2|π′(M)|) R ∞
2M φ(θ)π(θ)dθ
< ε/2.
Thus we have proved that |B(x)|/A0(x) < ε. Hence, B(x)/A0(x) → 0, which
shows that σ2(x) → 1 as x → ∞, and concludes the proof.
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